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Abstract
We provide a Keynesian growth theory in which pessimistic expectations can lead to very
persistent, or even permanent, slumps characterized by unemployment and weak growth. We
refer to these episodes as stagnation traps, because they consist in the joint occurrence of a
liquidity and a growth trap. In a stagnation trap, the central bank is unable to restore full
employment because weak growth depresses aggregate demand and pushes the interest rate
against the zero lower bound, while growth is weak because low aggregate demand results in low
profits, limiting firms’ investment in innovation. Policies aiming at restoring growth can
successfully lead the economy out of a stagnation trap, thus rationalizing the notion of job
creating growth.
JEL Codes: E32, E43, E52, O42.
Keywords: Secular Stagnation, Liquidity Traps, Growth Traps, Endogenous Growth, Multiple
Equilibria.
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Non-Technical Summary 
Can insufficient aggregate demand lead to economic stagnation, i.e. a protracted period of low growth and 
high unemployment? This question has recently attracted substantial attention in the policy debate, motivated 
by the two decades-long slump affecting Japan since the early 1990s, as well as by the slow recoveries 
experienced by the US and the Euro area in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, all these 
episodes have been characterized by long-lasting slumps in the context of policy rates at, or close to, the zero 
lower bound, leaving little room for conventional monetary stimulus. Moreover, during these episodes 
growth has been weak, resulting in large deviations of output from pre-slump trends. 
In this paper we present a theory in which very persistent, or even permanent, periods of stagnation are 
possible. Our key idea is that the connection between depressed demand, low interest rates and weak growth, 
far from being casual, might be the result of a two-way interaction. On the one hand, unemployment and 
weak aggregate demand might have a negative impact on firms’ investment in productivity-enhancing 
activities, and result in low growth. On the other hand, low growth might depress aggregate demand, pushing 
real interest rates down and nominal rates close to their zero lower bound, thus undermining the central bank 
ability to maintain full employment by cutting policy rates. To formalize this insight, and explore its policy 
implications, we propose a Keynesian growth framework, which combines elements of the endogenous 
growth and Keynesian theories. As in standard endogenous growth frameworks, productivity growth is the 
result of investment by profit maximizing firms. As in Keynesian models, due to the presence of nominal 
rigidities weak aggregate demand can give rise to unemployment.  
The possibility of long-lasting episodes of stagnation arises naturally in our model. In fact, stagnation can be 
the result of self-fulfilling pessimistic expectations. Intuitively, when agents become pessimistic about future 
growth they lower their expectations of future wealth, and hence their desired spending falls. If the central 
bank is constrained by the zero lower bound, and thus cannot counteract the fall in spending by lowering 
interest rates, the economy experiences a drop in aggregate demand and a rise in unemployment. In turn, 
lower aggregate demand reduces firms’ incentives to invest to increase their productive capacity, generating 
a drop in growth, which validates the initial pessimistic expectations. Through this channel, self-fulfilling 
pessimistic expectations can give rise to stagnation traps, which consist of long periods of low growth and 
high unemployment. 
A natural question to ask is which policy interventions can drive the economy out of a stagnation trap. Our 
model suggests that countercyclical subsidies to firms’ investment can fulfill this role, as long as they are 
sufficiently large. In fact, for a stagnation trap to take place expected growth must be low enough. This is 
necessary to generate a fall in aggregate demand sufficiently large to push the economy in a liquidity trap. 
However, large countercyclical subsidies to investment sustain growth, preventing self-fulfilling low growth 
expectations from materializing.  The result is that a program of countercyclical investment subsidies can 
rule out stagnation traps driven by pessimism.  
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1 Introduction
Can insufficient aggregate demand lead to economic stagnation, i.e. a protracted period of low
growth and high unemployment? Economists have been concerned with this question at least
since the Great Depression,1 but recently interest in this topic has reemerged motivated by the
two decades-long slump affecting Japan since the early 1990s, as well as by the slow recoveries
experienced by the US and the Euro area in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Indeed, as
shown by Table 1, all these episodes have been characterized by long-lasting slumps in the context
of policy rates at, or close to, their zero lower bound, leaving little room for conventional monetary
policy to stimulate demand. Moreover, during these episodes potential output growth has been
weak, resulting in large deviations of output from pre-slump trends (Figure 1).
In this paper we present a theory in which very persistent, or even permanent, slumps charac-
terized by unemployment and weak growth are possible. Our idea is that the connection between
depressed demand, low interest rates and weak growth, far from being casual, might be the result
of a two-way interaction. On the one hand, unemployment and weak aggregate demand might
have a negative impact on firms’ investment in innovation, and result in low growth. On the other
hand, low growth might depress aggregate demand, pushing real interest rates down and nominal
rates close to their zero lower bound, thus undermining the central bank’s ability to maintain full
employment by cutting policy rates.
To formalize this insight, and explore its policy implications, we propose a Keynesian growth
framework that sheds lights on the interactions between endogenous growth and liquidity traps.
The backbone of our framework is a standard model of vertical innovation, in the spirit of Aghion
and Howitt (1992). We modify this classic endogenous growth framework in two directions. First,
we introduce nominal wage rigidities, which create the possibility of involuntary unemployment,
and give rise to a channel through which monetary policy can affect the real economy. Second, we
take into account the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, which limits the central bank’s
ability to stabilize the economy with conventional monetary policy. Our theory thus combines the
Keynesian insight that unemployment might arise due to weak aggregate demand, with the notion,
developed by the endogenous growth literature, that productivity growth is the result of investment
in innovation by profit-maximizing agents. We show that the interaction between these two forces
can give rise to prolonged periods of low growth and high unemployment. We refer to these episodes
as stagnation traps, because they consist in the joint occurrence of a liquidity and a growth trap.
In our economy there are two types of agents: firms and households. Firms’ investment in
innovation determines endogenously the growth rate of productivity and potential output of our
economy. As in the standard models of vertical innovation, firms invest in innovation to gain a
monopoly position, and so their investment in innovation is positively related to profits. Through
this channel, a slowdown in aggregate demand that leads to a fall in profits, also reduces investment
in innovation and the growth rate of the economy. Households supply labor and consume, and
1See Hansen (1939) for an early discussion of the relationship between aggregate demand, unemployment and
technical progress.
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Table 1: Japan, United States, Euro area: before/during slump
Japan United States Euro area
1981- 1991- 1998- 2008- 1999- 2008-
1990 2014 2007 2014 2007 2014
Policy rate 4.34 0.86 3.68 0.35 2.91 1.15
Unemployment rate 2.50 4.02 4.90 7.88 8.67 10.37
Labor productivity growth 4.13 1.63 2.23 1.18 1.20 0.76
Notes: All the values are subsample averages expressed in percentage points. Labor
productivity is real GDP/hours worked. Data from IMF International Financial Statistics
and OECD.
their intertemporal consumption pattern is characterized by the traditional Euler equation. The
key aspect is that households’ current demand for consumption is affected by the growth rate of
potential output, because productivity growth is one of the determinants of households’ future
income. Hence, a low growth rate of potential output is associated with lower future income and
a reduction in current aggregate demand.
This two-way interaction between productivity growth and aggregate demand results in two
steady states. First, there is a full employment steady state, in which the economy operates at
potential and productivity growth is robust. However, our economy can also find itself in an
unemployment steady state. In the unemployment steady state aggregate demand and firms’
profits are low, resulting in low investment in innovation and weak productivity growth. Moreover,
monetary policy is not able to bring the economy at full employment, because the low growth of
potential output pushes the interest rate against its zero lower bound. Hence, the unemployment
steady state can be thought of as a stagnation trap.
Expectations, or animal spirits, are crucial in determining which equilibrium will be selected.
For instance, when agents expect growth to be low, expectations of low future income reduce
aggregate demand, lowering firms’ profits and their investment, thus validating the low growth ex-
pectations. Through this mechanism, pessimistic expectations can generate a permanent liquidity
trap with involuntary unemployment and stagnation. We also show that, aside from permanent
traps, pessimistic expectations can give rise to stagnation traps of finite, but arbitrarily long,
expected duration.
We then examine the policy implications of our framework. First we study optimal interest rate
policy. We show that a central bank operating under commitment can design interest rate rules
that eliminate the possibility of expectations-driven stagnation traps. However, we also show that if
the central bank lacks the ability to commit to its future actions stagnation traps are possible even
when interest rates are set optimally. We then turn to policies aiming at sustaining the growth rate
of potential output, by subsidizing investment in productivity-enhancing activities. While these
policies have been studied extensively in the context of the endogenous growth literature, here we
show that they operate not only through the supply side of the economy, but also by stimulating
aggregate demand during a liquidity trap. In fact, we show that an appropriately designed subsidy
to innovation can push the economy out of a stagnation trap and restore full employment, thus
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Figure 1: Real GDP per capita. Notes: Series shown in logs, undetrended, centered around 1990 for Japan, and
2007 for United States and Euro area. Gross domestic product, constant prices, from IMF World Economic Outlook,
divided by total population from World Bank World Development Indicators. The linear trend is computed over the
period 1981-1990 for Japan, and 1998-2007 for United States and Euro area.
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capturing the notion of job creating growth. However, our framework suggests that, in order to be
effective, the subsidy to innovation has to be sufficiently aggressive, so as to provide a “big push”
to the economy.
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. First, our paper is related to the
recent literature on secular stagnation (Caballero and Farhi, 2014; Eggertsson and Mehrotra, 2014;
Caballero et al., 2015; Michau, 2015; Asriyan et al., 2016; Eggertsson et al., 2016). This literature
builds on Hansen’s secular stagnation hypothesis (Hansen, 1939), that is the idea that a drop in
the natural real interest rate might push the economy in a long-lasting liquidity trap, characterized
by the absence of any self-correcting force to restore full employment.2 Hansen formulated this
concept inspired by the US Great Depression, but recently some commentators, most notably
Summers (2013) and Krugman (2013), have revived the idea of secular stagnation to rationalize
the long duration of the Japanese liquidity trap and the slow recoveries characterizing the US and
the Euro area after the 2008 financial crisis. Caballero and Farhi (2014) and Caballero et al. (2015)
conjecture that the secular decline in the real interest rate in the last decade is the byproduct of a
shortage of safe assets. In the overlapping-generations model studied by Eggertsson and Mehrotra
(2014) and Eggertsson et al. (2016), permanent liquidity traps are the outcome of shocks that alter
households’ lifecycle saving decisions. Asriyan et al. (2016) find that a permanent liquidity trap
can arise after the crash of a bubble that wipes out a large fraction of the collateral present in
the economy. Michau (2015) shows how secular stagnation can arise with infinitely-lived agents
when households derive utility from wealth. We see our paper being complementary to these
contributions, with the distinctive feature being that the fall in the real natural interest rate
that generates a permanent liquidity trap originates from an endogenous drop in investment in
innovation and productivity growth.3
As in the seminal frameworks developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman
(1991) and Romer (1990), long-run growth in our model is the result of investment in innovation by
profit-maximizing agents. A small, but growing, literature has considered the interactions between
short-run fluctuation and long run growth in this class of models (Fatas, 2000; Comin and Gertler,
2006; Aghion et al., 2010; Nun˜o, 2011; Queralto´, 2013; Aghion et al., 2009, 2014; Anzoategui et al.,
2015; Bianchi and Kung, 2015). However, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first ones to
study monetary policy in an endogenous growth model featuring a zero lower bound constraint on
the policy rate, and to show that the interaction between endogenous growth and liquidity traps
creates the possibility of long periods of stagnation.
Finally, our paper is linked to the literature on fluctuations driven by confidence shocks and
sunspots. Some examples of this vast literature are Kiyotaki (1988), Benhabib and Farmer (1994),
2Interestingly, Hansen (1939) lists a slowdown in technical progress as one of the possible causes of an episode of
secular stagnation.
3More broadly, the paper contributes to the large literature studying liquidity traps. This literature has focused
on slumps generated by ad-hoc preference shocks, as in Krugman (1998), Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and
Eggertsson (2008), or by financial shocks leading to tighter access to credit, as in Eggertsson and Krugman (2012)
and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011). In all these frameworks liquidity traps are driven by a temporary fall in
the natural real interest rate. Benhabib et al. (2001) study a permanent liquidity trap arising from self-fulfilling
expectations of future low inflation.
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Francois and Lloyd-Ellis (2003) and Farmer (2012). We contribute to this literature by describing
a new channel through which pessimistic expectations can give rise to economic stagnation.
The rest of the paper is composed of four sections. Section 2 describes the baseline model. Sec-
tion 3 shows that pessimistic expectations can generate arbitrarily long-lasting stagnation traps.
Section 4 extends the baseline model in several directions. Section 5 discusses some policy impli-
cations. Section 6 concludes.
2 Baseline Model
In this section we lay down our Keynesian growth framework. The economy has two key elements.
First, the rate of productivity growth is endogenous, and it is the outcome of firms’ investment in
research. Second, the presence of nominal rigidities imply that output can deviate from its potential
level, and that monetary policy can affect real variables. As we will see, the combination of these
two factors opens the door to fluctuations driven by shocks to agents’ expectations. To emphasize
this striking feature of the economy, in what follows we will abstract from any fundamental shock.4
Moreover, in order to deliver transparently our key results, in this section we will make some
simplifying assumptions that enhance the tractability of the model. These assumptions will be
relaxed in Section 4.
We consider an infinite-horizon closed economy. Time is discrete and indexed by t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}.
The economy is inhabited by households, firms, and by a central bank that sets monetary policy.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of measure one of identical households deriving utility from consumption of
a homogeneous “final” good. The lifetime utility of the representative household is:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ
)]
, (1)
where Ct denotes consumption, 0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount factor, σ is the inverse of
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and Et[·] is the expectation operator conditional on
information available at time t.
Each household is endowed with one unit of labor and there is no disutility from working.
However, due to the presence of nominal wage rigidities to be described below, a household might
be able to sell only Lt < 1 units of labor on the market. Hence, when Lt = 1 the economy operates
at full employment, while when Lt < 1 there is involuntary unemployment, and the economy
operates below capacity.
Households can trade in one-period, non-state contingent bonds bt. Bonds are denominated in
units of currency and pay the nominal interest rate it. Moreover, households own all the firms and
4To be clear, we believe that the study of fluctuations driven by fundamental shocks in the context of our model
is a promising research area, that we plan to pursue in the future.
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each period they receive dividends dt from them.
5
The intertemporal problem of the representative household consists in choosing Ct and bt+1 to
maximize expected utility, subject to a no-Ponzi constraint and the budget constraint:
PtCt +
bt+1
1 + it
= WtLt + bt + dt,
where Pt is the nominal price of the final good, bt+1 is the stock of bonds purchased by the
household in period t, and bt is the payment received from its past investment in bonds. Wt
denotes the nominal wage, so that WtLt is the household’s labor income.
The optimality conditions are:
λt =
C−σt
Pt
(2)
λt = β(1 + it)Et [λt+1] , (3)
where λt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, and the transversality condition
lims→∞Et
[
bt+s
(1+it)...(1+it+s)
]
= 0.
2.2 Final good production
The final good is produced by competitive firms using labor and a continuum of measure one
of intermediate inputs xj , indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Denoting by Yt the output of final good, the
production function is:
Yt = L
1−α
t
∫ 1
0
A1−αjt x
α
jtdj, (4)
where 0 < α < 1, and Ajt is the productivity, or quality, of input j.
6
Profit maximization implies the demand functions:
Pt(1− α)L−αt
∫ 1
0
A1−αjt x
α
jtdj = Wt (5)
PtαL
1−α
t A
1−α
jt x
α−1
jt = Pjt, (6)
where Pjt is the nominal price of intermediate input j. Due to perfect competition, firms in the
final good sector do not make any profit in equilibrium.
2.3 Intermediate goods production and profits
In every industry j producers compete as price-setting oligopolists. One unit of final output
is needed to manufacture one unit of intermediate good, regardless of quality, and hence every
producer faces the same marginal cost Pt. Our assumptions about the innovation process will
5To streamline the exposition, in the main text we consider a cashless economy. In Appendix B we show that
introducing money does not affect our results.
6More precisely, for every good j, Ajt represents the highest quality available. In principle, firms could produce
using a lower quality of good j. However, as in Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991),
the structure of the economy is such that in equilibrium only the highest quality version of each good is used in
production.
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ensure that in every industry there is a single leader able to produce good j of quality Ajt, and a
fringe of competitors which are able to produce a version of good j of quality Ajt/γ. The parameter
γ > 1 captures the distance in quality between the leader and the followers. Given this market
structure, it is optimal for the leader to capture the whole market for good j by charging the price:7
Pjt = ξPt, where ξ ≡ min
(
γ
α
1−α ,
1
α
)
> 1. (7)
This expression implies that the leader charges a constant markup ξ over its marginal cost. Intu-
itively, 1/α is the markup that the leader would choose in absence of the threat of entry from the
fringe of competitors. Instead, γα/(1−α) is the highest markup that the leader can charge without
losing the market to its competitors. It follows that if 1/α ≤ γα/(1−α) then the leader will charge
the unconstrained markup 1/α, otherwise it will set a markup equal to γα/(1−α) to deter entry. In
any case, the leader ends up satisfying all the demand for good j from final good producers.
Equations (6) and (7) imply that the quantity produced of a generic intermediate good j is:
xjt =
(
α
ξ
) 1
1−α
AjtLt. (8)
Combining equations (4) and (8) gives:
Yt =
(
α
ξ
) α
1−α
AtLt, (9)
where At ≡
∫ 1
0 Ajtdj is an index of average productivity of the intermediate inputs. Hence, pro-
duction of the final good is increasing in the average productivity of intermediate goods and in
aggregate employment. Moreover, the profits earned by the leader in sector j are given by:
Pjtxjt − Ptxjt = Pt$AjtLt,
where $ ≡ (ξ − 1) (α/ξ)1/(1−α). According to this expression, a leader’s profits are increasing
in the productivity of its intermediate input and on aggregate employment. The dependence of
profits from aggregate employment is due to the presence of a market size effect. Intuitively, high
employment is associated with high production of the final good and high demand for intermediate
inputs, leading to high profits in the intermediate sector.
2.4 Research and innovation
There is a large number of entrepreneurs that can attempt to innovate upon the existing products.
A successful entrepreneur researching in sector j discovers a new version of good j of quality γ
times greater than the best existing version, and becomes the leader in the production of good j.8
7For a detailed derivation see, for instance, the appendix to Chapter 7 of Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004).
8As in Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman and Helpman (1991), all the research activities are conducted by
entrants. Incumbents do not perform any research because the value of improving over their own product is smaller
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Entrepreneurs can freely target their research efforts at any of the continuum of intermediate
goods. An entrepreneur that invests Ijt units of the final good to discover an improved version of
product j innovates with probability:
µjt = min
(
χIjt
Ajt
, 1
)
,
where the parameter χ > 0 determines the productivity of research.9 The presence of the term
Ajt captures the idea that innovating upon more advanced and complex products requires a higher
investment, and ensures stationarity in the growth process. We consider time periods small enough
so that the probability that two or more entrepreneurs discover contemporaneously an improved
version of the same product is negligible. This assumption implies, mimicking the structure of
equilibrium in continuous-time models of vertical innovation such as Aghion and Howitt (1992)
and Grossman and Helpman (1991), that the probability that a product is improved is the sum of
the success probabilities of all the entrepreneurs targeting that product.10 With a slight abuse of
notation, we then denote by µjt the probability that an improved version of good j is discovered
at time t.
We now turn to the reward from research. A successful entrepreneur obtains a patent and
becomes the monopolist during the following period. For simplicity, in our baseline model we
assume that the monopoly position of an innovator lasts a single period, after which the patent is
allocated randomly to another entrepreneur.11 The value Vt(γAjt) of becoming a leader in sector
j and attaining productivity γAjt is given by:
Vt(γAjt) = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Pt+1$γAjtLt+1
]
. (10)
Vt(γAjt) is equal to the expected profits to be gained in period t+ 1, Pt+1$γAjtLt+1, discounted
using the households’ discount factor βλt+1/λt. Profits are discounted using the households’ dis-
count factor because entrepreneurs finance their investment in innovation by selling equity claims
on their future profits to the households. Competition for households’ funds leads entrepreneurs
to maximize the value to the households of their expected profits.
Free entry into research implies that expected profits from researching cannot be positive, so
than the profits that they would earn from developing a leadership position in a second market.
9Our formulation of the innovation process follows closely Chapter 7 of Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004) and Howitt
and Aghion (1998). An alternative is to assume, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), that labor is used as input
into research. This alternative assumption would lead to identical results, since ultimately output in our model is
fully determined by the stock of knowledge and aggregate labor.
10Following Aghion and Howitt (2009), we could have assumed that every period only a single entrepreneur can
invest in research in a given sector. This alternative assumption would lead to identical equilibrium conditions.
11This assumption, which is drawn from Aghion and Howitt (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2012), simplifies consid-
erably the analysis. In Section 4.3 we show that our results extend to a setting in which, more conventionally, the
innovator’s monopoly position is terminated when a new version of the product is discovered.
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that for every good j:12
Pt ≥ χ
Ajt
Vt(γAjt),
holding with equality if some research is conducted aiming at improving product j.13 Combining
this condition with expression (10) gives:
Pt
χ
≥ βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Pt+1γ$Lt+1
]
.
Notice that this condition does not depend on any variable specific to sector j, because the higher
profits associated with more advanced sectors are exactly offset by the higher research costs. As
is standard in the literature, we then focus on symmetric equilibria in which the probability of
innovation is the same in every sector, so that µjt = χIjt/Ajt = µt for every j. We can then
summarize the equilibrium in the research sector with the complementary slackness condition:
µt
(
Pt
χ
− βEt
[
λt+1
λt
Pt+1γ$Lt+1
])
= 0. (11)
Intuitively, either some research is conducted, so that µt > 0, and free entry drives expected profits
in the research sector to zero, or the expected profits from researching are negative and no research
is conducted, so that µt = 0.
2.5 Aggregation and market clearing
Market clearing for the final good implies:14
Yt −
∫ 1
0
xjtdj = Ct +
∫ 1
0
Ijtdj, (12)
where the left-hand side of this expression is the GDP of the economy, while the right-hand side
captures the fact that all the GDP has to be consumed or invested in research. Using equations
12To derive this condition, consider that an entrepreneur that invests Ijt in research has a probability χIjt/Ajt of
becoming a leader which carries value Vt(γAjt). Hence, the expected return from this investment is χIjtVt(γAjt)/Ajt.
Since the investment costs PtIjt, the free entry condition in the research sector implies:
PtIjt ≥ χIjt
Ajt
Vt(γAjt).
Simplifying we obtain the expression in the main text.
13It is customary in the endogenous growth literature to restrict attention to equilibria in which in every period a
positive amount of research is targeted toward every intermediate good. We take a slightly more general approach,
and allow for cases in which expected profits from research are too low to induce entrepreneurs to invest in innovation.
This degree of generality will prove important when we will discuss the policy implications of the framework.
14The goods market clearing condition can be derived combining the households’ budget constraint with the
expression for firms’ profits:
dt = PtYt −WtLt − ξPt
∫ 1
0
xjtdj︸ ︷︷ ︸
profits from final sector
+ (ξ − 1)Pt
∫ 1
0
xjtdj − Pt
∫ 1
0
Ijtdj︸ ︷︷ ︸
profits from intermediate sector
,
where profits are net of research expenditure, and the equilibrium condition bt+1 = 0, deriving from the assumption
of identical households.
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(8) and (9) we can write GDP as:
Yt −
∫ 1
0
xjtdj = ΨAtLt, (13)
where Ψ ≡ (α/ξ)α/(1−α) (1− α/ξ).
The assumption of a unitary labor endowment implies that Lt ≤ 1. Since labor is supplied
inelastically by the households, 1 − Lt can be interpreted as the unemployment rate. For future
reference, when Lt = 1 we say that the economy is operating at full employment, while when
Lt < 1 the economy operates below capacity and there is a negative output gap.
Long run growth in this economy takes place through increases in the quality of the intermediate
goods, captured by increases in the productivity index At. By the law of large numbers, a fraction
µt of intermediate products is improved every period. Hence, At evolves according to:
At+1 = µtγAt + (1− µt)At,
while the (gross) rate of productivity growth is:
gt+1 ≡ At+1
At
= µt (γ − 1) + 1. (14)
Recalling that µt = χIjt/Ajt, this expression implies that higher investment in research in period
t is associated with faster productivity growth between periods t and t+ 1.
2.6 Wages, prices and monetary policy
We consider an economy with frictions in the adjustment of nominal wages.15 The presence of
nominal wage rigidities plays two roles in our analysis. First, it creates the possibility of involuntary
unemployment, by ensuring that nominal wages remain positive even in presence of unemployment.
Second, it opens the door to a stabilization role for monetary policy. Indeed, as we will see, prices
inherit part of wage stickiness, so that the central bank can affect the real interest rate of the
economy through movements in the nominal interest rate.
In our baseline model, we consider the simplest possible form of nominal wage rigidities and
assume that wages evolve according to:
Wt = p¯i
wWt−1. (15)
This expression implies that nominal wage inflation is constant and equal to p¯iw, and could be
derived from the presence of large menu costs from deviating from the constant wage inflation
15 A growing body of evidence emphasizes how nominal wage rigidities represent an important transmission channel
through which monetary policy affects the real economy. For instance, this conclusion is reached by Olivei and
Tenreyro (2007), who show that monetary policy shocks in the US have a bigger impact on output in the aftermath
of the season in which wages are adjusted. Micro-level evidence on the importance of nominal wage rigidities is
provided by Fehr and Goette (2005), Gottschalk (2005), Barattieri et al. (2014) and Fabiani et al. (2010).
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path.
To be clear, our results do not rely at all on this extreme form of wage stickiness. Indeed,
in Section 4.2 we generalize our results to an economy in which wages are allowed to respond to
fluctuations in employment, giving rise to a wage Phillips curve. However, considering an economy
with constant wage inflation simplifies considerably the analysis, and allows us to characterize
transparently the key economic forces at the heart of the model.
Turning to prices, combining equations (5) and (8) gives:
Pt =
1
1− α
(
ξ
α
) α
1−α Wt
At
.
Intuitively, prices are increasing in the marginal cost of firms producing the final good. An increase
in wages puts upward pressure on marginal costs and leads to a rise in prices, while a rise in
productivity reduces marginal costs and prices. This expression, combined with the law of motion
for wages, can be used to derive an equation for price inflation:
pit ≡ Pt
Pt−1
=
p¯iw
gt
, (16)
which implies that price inflation is increasing in wage inflation and decreasing in productivity
growth.
The central bank implements its monetary policy stance by setting the nominal interest rate
according to the truncated interest rate rule:
1 + it = max
(
(1 + i¯)Lφt , 1
)
,
where i¯ ≥ 0 and φ > 0. Under this rule the central bank aims at stabilizing output around its
potential level by cutting the interest rate in response to falls in employment.16 The nominal
interest rate is subject to a zero lower bound constraint, which, as we show in Appendix B, can
be derived from standard arbitrage between money and bonds.
2.7 Equilibrium
The equilibrium of our economy can be described by four simple equations. The first one is
the Euler equation, which captures households’ consumption decisions. Combining households’
optimality conditions (2) and (3) gives:
C−σt = β(1 + it)Et
[
C−σt+1
pit+1
]
.
16To clarify, this particular form of interest rate rule is by no means essential for the results of the paper. For
instance, following the work of Erceg et al. (2000), it is often assumed that in presence of flexible prices and rigid
wages the central bank aims at stabilizing wage inflation. We consider this possibility in Section 4.2. Instead, in
Section 5.1 we derive the optimal interest rate policy.
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According to this standard Euler equation, demand for consumption is increasing in expected
future consumption and decreasing in the real interest rate, (1 + it)/pit+1.
To understand how productivity growth relates to demand for consumption, it is useful to
combine the previous expression with At+1/At = gt+1 and pit+1 = p¯i
w/gt+1 to obtain:
cσt =
gσ−1t+1 p¯i
w
β(1 + it)Et
[
c−σt+1
] , (17)
where we have defined ct ≡ Ct/At as consumption normalized by the productivity index. This equa-
tion shows that the relationship between productivity growth and present demand for consumption
can be positive or negative, depending on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1/σ. There
are, in fact, two contrasting effects. On the one hand, faster productivity growth is associated with
higher future wealth. This wealth effect leads households to increase their demand for current
consumption in response to a rise in productivity growth. On the other hand, faster productivity
growth is associated with a fall in expected inflation. Given it, lower expected inflation increases
the real interest rate inducing households to postpone consumption. This substitution effect points
toward a negative relationship between productivity growth and current demand for consumption.
For low levels of intertemporal substitution, i.e. for σ > 1, the wealth effect dominates and the
relationship between productivity growth and demand for consumption is positive. Instead, for
high levels of intertemporal substitution, i.e. for σ < 1, the substitution effect dominates and the
relationship between productivity growth and demand for consumption is negative. Finally, for
the special case of log utility, σ = 1, the two effects cancel out and productivity growth does not
affect present demand for consumption.17
Empirical estimates point toward an elasticity of intertemporal substitution smaller than one.18
Hence, in the main text we will focus attention on the case σ > 1, while we provide an analysis of
the cases σ < 1 and σ = 1 in the appendix.
Assumption 1 The parameter σ satisfies:
σ > 1.
17To clarify, different assumptions about wage or price setting can lead to a positive relationship between produc-
tivity growth and present demand for consumption even in presence of an elasticity of intertemporal substitution
larger than one. For instance, a plausible assumption is that wages are partly indexed to productivity growth, so
that:
Wt = p¯i
wgωt Wt−1,
where ω > 0. In this case, the Euler equation becomes:
cσt =
gσ−1+ωt+1 p¯i
w
β(1 + it)Et
[
c−σt+1
] ,
so that a positive relationship between demand for consumption and productivity growth arises as long as σ > 1−ω.
18Havra´nek (2015) performs a meta-analysis of the literature and finds that, though substantial uncertainty about
the exact value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution exists, most estimates lie well below one. Examples
of papers estimating an elasticity smaller than one are Hall (1988) and Ogaki and Reinhart (1998), who use macro
data, and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and Best et al. (2015), who use micro data.
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Under this assumption, the Euler equation implies a positive relationship between the pace of
innovation and demand for present consumption.
The second key relationship in our model is the growth equation, which is obtained by combining
equation (2) with the optimality condition for investment in research (11):
(gt+1 − 1)
(
1− βEt
[(
ct
ct+1
)σ
g−σt+1χγ$Lt+1
])
= 0. (18)
This equation captures the optimal investment in research by entrepreneurs. For values of profits
sufficiently high so that some research is conducted in equilibrium and gt+1 > 1, this equation
implies a positive relationship between growth and expected future employment. Intuitively, a
rise in employment, and consequently in aggregate demand, is associated with higher monopoly
profits. In turn, higher expected profits induce entrepreneurs to invest more in research, leading
to a positive impact on the growth rate of the economy. This is the classic market size effect
emphasized by the endogenous growth literature.
The third equation combines the goods market clearing condition (12), the GDP equation (13)
and the fact that
∫ 1
0 Ijtdj = At(gt+1 − 1)/(χ(γ − 1)):19
ct = ΨLt − gt+1 − 1
χ(γ − 1) . (19)
Keeping output constant, this equation implies a negative relationship between productivity-
adjusted consumption and growth, because to generate faster growth the economy has to devote a
larger fraction of output to innovation activities, reducing the resources available for consumption.
Finally, the fourth equation is the monetary policy rule:
1 + it = max
(
(1 + i¯)Lφt , 1
)
. (20)
We are now ready to define an equilibrium as a set of processes {gt+1, Lt, ct, it}+∞t=0 satisfying
equations (17)− (20) and Lt ≤ 1 for all t ≥ 0.
3 Stagnation traps
In this section we show that the interaction between aggregate demand and productivity growth
can give rise to prolonged periods of low growth, low interest rates and high unemployment, which
we call stagnation traps. We start by considering non-stochastic steady states, and we derive
conditions on the parameters under which two steady states coexist, one of which is a stagnation
trap. We then show that stagnation traps of finite expected duration are also possible.
19To derive this condition, consider that:∫ 1
0
Ijtdj =
∫ 1
0
AjtIjt/Ajtdj = Ijt/Ajt
∫ 1
0
Ajtdj = µt/χ
∫ 1
0
Ajtdj = Atµt/χ = At(gt+1 − 1)/(χ(γ − 1)),
where we have used the fact that Ijt/Ajt is the same across all the j sectors.
ECB Working Paper 2038, March 2017 16
3.1 Non-stochastic steady states
Non-stochastic steady state equilibria are characterized by constant values for productivity growth
g, employment L, normalized consumption c and the nominal interest rate i satisfying:
gσ−1 =
β(1 + i)
p¯iw
(21)
gσ = max (βχγ$L, 1) (22)
c = ΨL− g − 1
χ(γ − 1) (23)
1 + i = max
(
(1 + i¯)Lφ, 1
)
, (24)
where the absence of a time subscript denotes the value of a variable in a non-stochastic steady
state. We now show that two steady state equilibria can coexist: one characterized by full employ-
ment, and one by involuntary unemployment.
Full employment steady state. We start by describing the full employment steady state,
which we denote by the superscripts f . In the full employment steady state the economy operates
at full capacity, and hence Lf = 1. The growth rate associated with the full employment steady
state, gf , is found by setting L = 1 in equation (22):
gf = max
(
(βχγ$)
1
σ , 1
)
. (25)
The nominal interest rate that supports the full employment steady state, if , is obtained by setting
g = gf in equation (21):
if =
(
gf
)σ−1
p¯iw
β
− 1. (26)
The monetary policy rule (24) then implies that for a full employment steady state to exist the
central bank must set i¯ = if . Finally, steady state (normalized) consumption, cf , is obtained by
setting L = 1 and g = gf in equation (23):
cf = Ψ− g
f − 1
χ(γ − 1) .
We summarize our results about the full employment steady state in a proposition.
Assumption 2 The parameters satisfy:
i¯ =
(βχγ$)1−
1
σ p¯iw
β
− 1 > 0 (27)
φ > max
(
1− 1
σ
,
1
(βχγ$)
1
σ
)
(28)
1 < (βχγ$)
1
σ < min (1 + Ψχ(γ − 1), γ) . (29)
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Proposition 1 Suppose assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, there exists a unique full employment
steady state with Lf = 1. The full employment steady state is characterized by positive growth
(gf > 1) and by a positive nominal interest rate (if > 0). Moreover, the full employment steady
state is locally determinate.20
Intuitively, assumptions (27) and (28) guarantee that monetary policy and wage inflation are
consistent with the existence of a, locally determinate, full employment steady state. Condition (27)
ensures that the intercept of the interest rate rule is consistent with existence of a full employment
steady state, and that inflation and productivity growth in the full employment steady state
are sufficiently high so that the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate is not
binding. Instead, condition (28), which requires the central bank to respond sufficiently strongly to
fluctuations in employment, ensures that the full employment steady state is locally determinate.21
Assumption (29) has a dual role. First, it makes sure that consumption in the full employment
steady state is positive. Second, it implies that in the full employment steady state the innovation
probability lies between zero and one (0 < µf < 1), an assumption often made in the endogenous
growth literature.
Summing up, the full employment steady state can be thought as the normal state of affairs
of the economy. In fact, in this steady state, which closely resembles the steady state commonly
considered both in New Keynesian and endogenous growth models, the economy operates at its
full potential, growth is robust, and monetary policy is not constrained by the zero lower bound.
Unemployment steady state. Aside from the full employment steady state, the economy
can find itself in a permanent liquidity trap with low growth and involuntary unemployment. We
denote this unemployment steady state with superscripts u. To derive the unemployment steady
state, consider that with i = 0 equation (21) implies:
gu =
(
β
p¯iw
) 1
σ−1
.
Since i¯ > 0 it follows immediately from equation (21) that gu < gf . Moreover, notice that equation
(21) can be written as (1+i)/pi = gσ/β. Hence, gu < gf implies that the real interest rate (1+i)/pi
in the unemployment steady state is lower than in the full employment steady state. To see that
the liquidity trap steady state is characterized by unemployment, consider that by equation (22)
(gu)σ = max(βχγ$Lu, 1). Now use βχγ$ = gf to rewrite this expression as:
Lu ≤
(
gu
gf
)σ
< 1,
where the second inequality derives from gu < gf . Productivity-adjusted steady state consumption,
20All the proofs are collected in Appendix A.
21Similar assumptions are commonly made in the literature studying monetary policy in New Keynesian models
(Gal´ı, 2009). In fact, analyses based on the New Keynesian framework typically focus on fluctuations around a steady
state in which output is equal to its natural level, that is the value that would prevail in absence of nominal rigidities,
and the nominal interest rate is positive. Moreover, local determinacy is typically ensured by assuming that the
central bank follows an interest rate rule that reacts sufficiently strongly to fluctuations in inflation or output.
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cu, is then obtained by setting L = Lu and g = gu in equation (23):
cu = ΨLu − g
u − 1
χ(γ − 1) .
The following proposition summarizes our results about the unemployment steady state.
Proposition 2 Suppose assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and that
1 <
(
β
p¯iw
) 1
σ−1
(30)
(
β
p¯iw
) 1
σ−1
< 1 +
ξ
α − 1
ξ − 1
(
β
(p¯iw)σ
) 1
σ−1 γ − 1
γ
. (31)
Then, there exists a unique unemployment steady state. At the unemployment steady state the
economy is in a liquidity trap (iu = 0), there is involuntary unemployment (Lu < 1), and both
growth and the real interest rate are lower than in the full employment steady state (gu < gf and
1/piu < (1 + if )/pif ). Moreover, the unemployment steady state is locally indeterminate.
Assumption (30) implies that gu > 1, and its role is to ensure existence and uniqueness of the
unemployment steady state. To gain intuition, consider a case in which assumption (30) is violated.
Then, it is easy to check that a liquidity trap steady state would feature a negative real interest
rate and negative productivity growth. However, since the quality of intermediate inputs does not
depreciate, a steady state with negative productivity growth cannot exist.22 We will go back to
this point in Section 4.1, where we introduce the possibility of a steady state with a negative real
rate. Instead, assumption (31) makes sure that cu > 0. Uniqueness is ensured by the fact that by
equation (22) there exists a unique value of L consistent with g = gu > 1.23 Finally, assumption
(28) guarantees that the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds in the unemployment
steady state.
Proposition 2 states that the unemployment steady state is locally indeterminate, so that
animal spirits and sunspots can generate local fluctuations around its neighborhood. This result
is not surprising, given that in the unemployment steady state the central bank is constrained by
the zero lower bound, and hence monetary policy cannot respond to changes in aggregate demand
driven by self-fulfilling expectations.
We think of this second steady state as a stagnation trap, that is the combination of a liquidity
and a growth trap. In a liquidity trap the economy operates below capacity because the central
22Since β < 1 and gu > 1, in our baseline model an unemployment steady state exists only if p¯iw < 1, that is if wage
inflation is negative. This happens because in a representative agent economy with positive productivity growth the
steady state real interest rate must be positive. In turn, when the nominal interest rate is equal to zero, deflation
is needed to ensure that the real interest rate is positive. However, this is not a deep feature of our framework,
and it is not hard to modify the model to allow for positive wage inflation and a negative real interest rate in the
unemployment steady state. For instance, in Section 4.1 we show that the presence of precautionary savings due to
idiosyncratic shocks creates the conditions for an unemployment steady state with positive inflation and negative
real rate to exist.
23Notice that this assumption rules out the case gu = 1. Under this knife-edged case an unemployment steady
state might exist, but it will not be unique, since by equation (22) multiple values of L are consistent with g = 1.
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Figure 2: Non-stochastic steady states.
bank is constrained by the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate. In a growth trap, lack
of demand for firms’ products depresses investment in innovation and prevents the economy from
developing its full growth potential. In a stagnation trap these two events are tightly connected.
We illustrate this point with the help of a diagram.
Figure 2 depicts the two key relationships that characterize the steady states of our model in
the L− g space. The first one is the growth equation (22), which corresponds to the GG schedule.
For sufficiently high L, the GG schedule is upward sloped. The positive relationship between L
and G can be explained with the fact that, for L high enough, an increase in employment and
production is associated with a rise in firms’ profits, while higher profits generate an increase in
investment in innovation and productivity growth. Instead, for low values of L the GG schedule
is horizontal. These are the values of employment for which investing in research is not profitable,
and hence they are associated with zero growth.
The second key relationship combines the Euler equation (21) and the policy rule (24):
gσ−1 =
β
p¯iw
max
(
(1 + i¯)Lφ, 1
)
.
Graphically, this relationship is captured by the AD, i.e. aggregate demand, curve. The upward-
sloped portion of the AD curve corresponds to cases in which the zero lower bound constraint on the
nominal interest rate is not binding.24 In this part of the state space, the central bank responds to a
rise in employment by increasing the nominal rate. In turn, to be consistent with households’ Euler
equation, a higher interest rate must be coupled with faster productivity growth.25 Hence, when
monetary policy is not constrained by the zero lower bound the AD curve generates a positive
relationship between L and g. Instead, the horizontal portion of the AD curve corresponds to
values of L for which the zero lower bound constraint binds. In this case, the central bank sets
i = 0 and steady state growth is independent of L and equal to (β/p¯iw)1/(σ−1). As long as the
conditions specified in propositions 1 and 2 hold, the two curves cross twice and two steady states
24Precisely, the zero lower bound constraint does not bind when L ≥ (1 + i¯)−1/φ.
25Recall that we are focusing on the case σ > 1.
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Figure 3: Understanding stagnation traps. Left panel: economy without zero lower bound. Right panel: economy
with exogenous growth.
are possible.
Importantly, both the presence of the zero lower bound and the procyclicality of investment in
innovation are needed to generate steady state multiplicity. Suppose that the central bank is not
constrained by the zero lower bound, and hence that liquidity traps are not possible. As illustrated
by the left panel of Figure 3, in this case the AD curve reduces to an upward sloped curve, steeper
than the GG curve, and the unemployment steady state disappears. Intuitively, the assumptions
about monetary policy ensure that, in absence of the zero lower bound, the central bank’s reaction
to unemployment is always sufficiently strong to ensure that the only possible steady state is the
full employment one.26
Now suppose instead that productivity growth is constant and equal to gf . In this case, as
shown by the right panel of Figure 3, the GG curve reduces to a horizontal line at g = gf , and
again the full employment steady state is the only possible one. Indeed, if growth is not affected
by variations in employment, then condition (27) guarantees that aggregate demand and inflation
are sufficiently high so that in steady state the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest
rate does not bind, ensuring that the economy operates at full employment.
We are left with determining what makes the economy settle in one of the two steady states.
This role is fulfilled by expectations. Suppose that agents expect that the economy will perma-
nently fluctuate around the full employment steady state. Then, their expectations of high future
growth sustain aggregate demand, so that a positive nominal interest rate is consistent with full
employment. In turn, if the economy operates at full employment then firms’ profits are high,
inducing high investment in innovation and productivity growth. Conversely, suppose that agents
26To see this point, consider that ignoring the zero lower bound and using 1+ i¯ = p¯iwβ−
1
σ (χγ$)
σ−1
σ the AD curve
can be written as
g = (βχγ$)
1
σ L
φ
σ−1 .
Recalling that the GG curve is g = max
(
(βχγ$L)1/σ , 1
)
, we have that the assumption φ > 1 − 1/σ implies that
for any 0 < L < 1 the AD curve lies below the GG curve. The result is that the two curves cannot cross at any
0 < L < 1, unless the zero lower bound binds.
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Figure 4: An example of transition toward the unemployment steady state.
expect that the economy will permanently remain in a liquidity trap. In this case, low expectations
about growth and future income depress aggregate demand, making it impossible for the central
bank to sustain full employment due to the zero lower bound constraint on the interest rate. As
a result the economy operates below capacity and firms’ profits are low, so that investment in
innovation is also low, justifying the initial expectations of weak growth. Hence, in our model ex-
pectations can be self-fulfilling, and sunspots, that is confidence shocks unrelated to fundamentals,
can determine real outcomes.
Interestingly, the transition from one steady state to the other need not take place in a single
period. In fact, there are multiple perfect foresight paths, on which agents’ expectations can
coordinate, that lead the economy to the unemployment steady state. Figure 4 shows one of these
paths.27 The economy starts in the full employment steady state. In period 5 the economy is hit
by a previously unexpected shock to expectations, which leads agents to revise downward their
expectations of future productivity growth. From then on, the economy embarks in a perfect
foresight transition toward the unemployment steady state. Initially, pessimism about future
productivity triggers a fall in aggregate demand, leading to a rise in unemployment, to which
the central bank responds by lowering the policy rate. In period 6 there is a further drop in
expected productivity growth, causing a further rise in unemployment which pushes the economy
in a liquidity trap. This initiates a long-lasting liquidity trap, during which the economy converges
smoothly to the unemployment steady state.
Summarizing, the combination of growth driven by investment in innovation from profit-
maximizing firms and the zero lower bound constraint on monetary policy can produce stagnation
traps, that is permanent, or very long lasting, liquidity traps characterized by unemployment and
low growth. All it takes is a sunspot that coordinates agents’ expectations on a path that leads to
the unemployment steady state.
Before moving on, it is useful to compare our notion of stagnation traps with the permanent
liquidity traps that can arise in the New Keynesian model. In the standard New Keynesian model
27Appendix D provides the numerical algorithm used to find perfect foresight paths that lead to the unemployment
steady state. The parameters used to construct the figure are β = .99, σ = 2, γ = 1.05, χ = 89.14, α = .5, p¯iw = .98
and φ = 1. This parameterization is purely illustrative. Section 4.3 presents a calibration exercise.
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productivity growth is exogenous, and there is a unique real interest rate consistent with a steady
state. As shown by Benhabib et al. (2001), permanent liquidity traps can occur in these frameworks
if agents coordinate their expectations on an inflation rate equal to the inverse of the steady state
real interest rate. Because of this, the New Keynesian model typically feature two steady states,
one of which is a permanent liquidity trap. These two steady states are characterized by the same
real interest rate, but by different inflation and nominal interest rates, with the liquidity trap
steady state being associated with inflation below the central bank’s target.
In contrast, in our framework endogenous growth is key in opening the door to steady state
multiplicity and permanent liquidity traps. Crucially, in our model the two steady states feature
different growth and real interest rates, with the liquidity trap steady state being associated with
low growth and low real interest rate. Instead, inflation expectations do not play a major role. In
fact, once a wage Phillips curve is introduced in the model, it might very well be the case that
inflation in the unemployment steady state is the same, or even higher, than in the full employment
one. We will go back to this point in Section 4.2.
3.2 Temporary stagnation traps
Though our model can allow for economies which are permanently in a liquidity trap, it is not
difficult to construct equilibria in which the expected duration of a trap is finite. To construct
an equilibrium featuring a temporary liquidity trap we have to put some structure on the sunspot
process. Let us start by denoting a sunspot by ξt. In a sunspot equilibrium agents form their
expectations about the future after observing ξ, so that the sunspot acts as a coordination de-
vice for agents’ expectations. Following Mertens and Ravn (2014), let us consider a two-state
discrete Markov process, ξt ∈ (ξo, ξp), with transition probabilities Pr (ξt+1 = ξo|ξt = ξo) = 1 and
Pr (ξt+1 = ξ
p|ξt = ξp) = q < 1. The first state is an absorbing optimistic equilibrium, in which
agents expect to remain forever around the full employment steady state. Hence, once ξt = ξ
o the
economy settles on the full employment steady state, characterized by L = 1 and g = gf . The
second state ξp is a pessimistic equilibrium with finite expected duration 1/(1 − q). In this state
the economy is in a liquidity trap with unemployment. We consider an economy that starts in the
pessimistic equilibrium.
Under these assumptions, as long as the pessimistic sunspot shock persists the equilibrium is
described by equations (17), (18) and (19), which, using the fact that in the pessimistic state i = 0,
can be written as:
(gp)σ−1 =
β
p¯iw
(
q + (1− q)
(
cp
cf
)σ)
(32)
(gp − 1)
(
(gp)σ − βχγ$
(
qLp + (1− q)
(
cp
cf
)σ))
= 0. (33)
cp = ΨLp − g
p − 1
χ(γ − 1) , (34)
where the superscripts p denote the equilibrium while pessimistic expectations prevail. Similar to
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Figure 5: A temporary stagnation trap: expected dynamics.
the case of the unemployment steady state, in the pessimistic equilibrium the zero lower bound
constraint on the interest rate binds, there is involuntary unemployment and growth is lower than
in the optimistic state.
Characterizing analytically the equilibrium described by equations (32) − (34) is challenging,
but some results can be obtained by using gu = (β/p¯iw)1/(σ−1) to write equation (32) as:
(gp)σ−1 = (gu)σ−1
(
qp + (1− qp)
(
cp
cf
)σ)
.
It can be shown that cp/cf is smaller than one, i.e. switching to the optimistic steady state
entails an increase in productivity-adjusted consumption. Hence, the equation above implies that
temporary liquidity traps feature slower growth compared to permanent ones.
Figure 5 displays the expected path of productivity growth, unemployment and the nominal in-
terest rate during a temporary liquidity trap.28 The economy starts in the pessimistic equilibrium,
characterized by low growth, high unemployment and a nominal interest rate equal to zero. From
the second period on, each period agents expect that the economy will leave the trap and go back
to the full employment steady state with a constant probability. Hence, the probability that the
economy remains in the trap decreases with time, explaining the upward path for expected pro-
ductivity growth, employment and the nominal interest rate. However, even though the economy
eventually goes back to the full employment steady state, the post-trap increase in the growth rate
is not sufficiently strong to make up for the low growth during the trap, so that the trap generates
a permanent loss in output.
This example shows that pessimistic expectations can plunge the economy into a temporary
liquidity trap with unemployment and low growth. Eventually the economy will recover, but the
liquidity trap lasts as long as pessimistic beliefs persist. Hence, long lasting liquidity trap driven
by pessimistic expectations can coexist with the possibility of a future recovery.
28To construct this figure we have used the same parameters used to construct Figure 4, and set 1/(1− q) = 10.
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4 Extensions and Numerical Exercise
In this section we extend the model in three directions. We first show that the introduction of
precautionary savings can give rise to stagnation traps characterized by positive inflation and a
negative real interest rate. We then show that our key results do not rely on the assumption
of a constant wage inflation rate. Lastly, we perform a simple calibration exercise to examine a
setting in which, consistent with standard models of vertical innovation, the duration of innovators’
monopoly rents is endogenous.
4.1 Precautionary savings and negative real rates
In our baseline framework positive growth and positive inflation cannot coexist during a permanent
liquidity trap. Intuitively, if the economy is at the zero lower bound with positive inflation, then
the real interest rate must be negative. But then, to satisfy households’ Euler equation, the steady
state growth rate of the economy must also be negative. Conversely, to be consistent with positive
steady state growth the real interest rate must be positive, and when the nominal interest rate is
equal to zero this requires deflation.
However, it is not hard to think about mechanisms that could make positive growth and positive
steady state inflation coexist in an unemployment steady state. One possibility is to introduce
precautionary savings. In Appendix E, we lay down a simple model in which every period a
household faces a probability p of becoming unemployed. An unemployed household receives an
unemployment benefit, such that its income is equal to a fraction b < 1 of the income of an
employed household. Unemployment benefits are financed with taxes on the employed households.
We also assume that unemployed households cannot borrow and that trade in firms’ share is not
possible.
As showed in the appendix, under these assumptions the Euler equation (17) is replaced by:
cσt =
p¯iwgσ−1t+1
β(1 + it)ρEt
[
c−σt+1
] ,
where:
ρ ≡ 1− p+ p/bσ > 1.29
The unemployment steady state is now characterized by:
gu =
(
ρβ
p¯iw
) 1
σ−1
. (35)
Since ρ > 1, an unemployment steady state in which both inflation and growth are positive, and
29The other equilibrium conditions are the same as in baseline model, except for the growth equation (18) which
becomes:
(gt+1 − 1)
(
1− ρβEt
[(
ct
ct+1
)σ
g−σt+1χγ$Lt+1
])
= 0.
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the real interest rate is negative, is now possible.
The key intuition behind this result is that the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk de-
presses the real interest rate.30 Indeed, the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk drives up the
demand for precautionary savings. Since the supply of saving instruments is fixed, higher demand
for precautionary savings leads to a lower equilibrium interest rate. This is the reason why an
economy with uninsurable unemployment risk can reconcile positive steady state growth with a
negative real interest rate. Hence, once the possibility of uninsurable unemployment risk is taken
into account, it is not hard to imagine a permanent liquidity trap with positive growth, positive
inflation and negative real interest rate.
This is a good moment to discuss the relationship between the structural determinants of
the propensity to save and the possibility of self-fulfilling stagnation traps. Looking at equation
(35), and recalling that in our model productivity growth cannot be negative, one can see that
an unemployment steady state is possible only if ρβ ≥ piw. For lower values of ρβ, in fact,
households’ propensity to save would be too low to make a real interest rate of 1/piw consistent
with nonnegative steady state growth.31 This suggests that self-fulfilling stagnation traps are
possible only in economies in which the fundamentals are such that the desire to save, captured in
our model by the parameters β and ρ, is sufficiently high.
It has been argued that since the early 1980s several factors, such as population aging and
higher inequality, have increased the supply of savings in several advanced economies.32 In this
respect, our framework suggests that the same structural factors that have increased the supply of
savings might have also exposed advanced economies to the risk of self-fulfilling stagnation traps.
4.2 Introducing a wage Phillips curve
Our basic model features a constant wage inflation rate. Here we introduce a wage Phillips curve,
and discuss the implications of our model for inflation and the role of wage flexibility.
To make things simple let us assume, in the spirit of Akerlof et al. (1996), that nominal wages
are downwardly rigid:
Wt ≥ ψ (Lt)Wt−1,
with ψ′ > 0, ψ(1) = p¯iw. This formulation allows wages to fall at a rate which depends on
unemployment. Capturing some nonmonetary costs from adjusting wages downward, here wages
are more downwardly flexible the more employment is below potential. This form of wage rigidity
gives rise to a nonlinear wage Phillips curve. For levels of wage inflation greater than p¯iw output
is at potential. Instead, if wage inflation is less than p¯iw there is a positive relationship between
inflation and the output gap.
Similar to the baseline model, monetary policy follows a truncated interest rate rule in which
30See Huggett (1993).
31Graphically, this corresponds to a case in which the horizontal portion of the AD curve is lower than the
horizontal portion of the GG curve.
32For instance, see Rachel and Smith (2015) for an account of the factors that have driven the supply of savings
in the global economy during the last 30 years.
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the nominal interest rate responds to deviations of wage inflation from a target pi∗:
1 + it = max
(
(1 + i¯)
(
piwt
pi∗
)φ
, 1
)
. (36)
We assume that pi∗ ≥ p¯i, so that when wage inflation is on target the economy operates at full
employment. We also assume that 1 + i¯ = pi∗
(
βχγ$)1/σ and that φ is sufficiently large so that
pi∗Lφσ/(σ−1) < ψ(L) for any 0 ≤ L ≤ 1. This assumption, similar to assumption (28) of the baseline
model, ensures local real determinacy of the full employment steady state and that, in the absence
of the zero lower bound, there are no steady states other than the full employment one.
A steady state of the economy is now described by (22), (23), (36) and:
gσ−1 =
β(1 + i)
piw
(37)
piw ≥ ψ(L). (38)
It is easy to check that there exists a unique full employment steady state with L = 1, g =
(βχγ$)1/σ and piw = pi∗. Hence, the presence of the wage Phillips curve does not affect employment
and growth in the full employment steady state.
Let us now turn to the unemployment steady state. Combining equations (36)− (38) and using
i = 0, gives:
gu =
(
β
ψ(Lu)
) 1
σ−1
. (39)
This expression implies a negative relationship between growth and employment. To understand
this relationship, consider that in a liquidity trap the real interest rate is just the inverse of expected
inflation. Due to the wage Phillips curve, as employment increases wage inflation rises generating
higher price inflation. Hence, in a liquidity trap a higher employment is associated with a lower real
interest rate. The consequence is that during a permanent liquidity trap a rise in employment must
be associated with lower productivity growth, to be consistent with the lower real interest rate.
As illustrated by Figure 6, graphically this is captured by the fact that the AD curve, obtained by
combining equations (36) − (38), is downward sloped for values of L low enough so that the zero
lower bound constraint binds.33
To solve for the equilibrium unemployment steady state, combine equations (22) and (39) to
obtain:
Lu =
1
βχγ$
(
β
ψ(Lu)
) σ
σ−1
. (40)
Since the left-hand side of this expression is increasing in Lu, while the right hand-side is decreasing
in Lu, there is a unique Lu that characterizes the unemployment steady state. Moreover, since
Lu < 1, the presence of a Phillips curve implies that the unemployment steady state is now
characterized by lower wage inflation than the full employment steady state. In sum, the presence
33Moreover, the AD curve has now a vertical portion to capture the fact that the wage Phillips curve becomes
vertical at L = 1.
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Figure 6: Steady states with variable inflation.
of a wage Phillips curve does not alter the key properties of the unemployment steady state, while
adding the realistic feature that in the unemployment steady state the central bank undershoots
its wage inflation target.
Turning to price inflation, recalling that pit = pi
w
t /gt+1, we have that:
piu
pif
=
ψ(Lu)
pi∗
gf
gu
.
Since ψ(Lu) < pi∗ and gf > gu, depending on parameter values price inflation in the unemployment
steady state can be above, below or even equal to price inflation in the full employment steady
state. This result is due to the fact that in the unemployment steady state the depressive impact
on firms’ marginal costs and price inflation originating from low wage inflation is counteracted by
the upward pressure exerted by low productivity growth.34
To conclude this section, we note that higher wage flexibility, captured by a steeper wage
Phillips curve, is associated with better outcomes in the unemployment steady state. For instance,
this result can be seen by considering that expression (40) implies that the endogenous fall in wage
inflation, captured by the term ψ(Lu), sustains employment in the unemployment steady state.
Figure 6 illustrates graphically the impact of higher wage flexibility on the determination of the
unemployment steady state. The figure shows that higher wage flexibility steepens the downward
portion of the AD curve, leading to higher growth and employment in the unemployment steady
state. This is an interesting result, in light of the fact that analyses based on the standard New
Keynesian framework suggest that higher price or wage flexibility typically lead to worse outcomes
in terms of output during liquidity traps (Eggertsson, 2010).
34Interestingly, during the Great Recession several countries have experienced sharp recessions without substantial
deflation. The model suggests that the absence of deflation might be explained with the fact that the aftermath of
the 2008 financial crisis was also characterized by a slowdown in productivity growth.
ECB Working Paper 2038, March 2017 28
4.3 Numerical exercise
In this section, we explore further the properties of the model by performing a simple calibration
exercise. To be clear, the objective of this exercise is not to provide a careful quantitative evaluation
of the framework or to replicate any particular historical event. In fact, both of these tasks would
require a much richer model. Rather, our aim is to show that the magnitudes implied by the model
are quantitatively relevant and reasonable.
For our numerical exercise we enrich the baseline model in two dimensions. First, along the
lines of Section 4.2, we consider an economy with downward wage rigidities. Second, we relax the
assumption of one period monopoly rents for innovators in favor of a, more conventional, setting
in which the duration of innovators’ rents is endogenous.
Endogenous duration of rents from innovation. In our baseline model we assume that
the rents from innovation last a single period, after which the innovator’s patent expires. Here we
consider a setting in which every period the innovator retains its patent with probability 1− η.35
Under these assumptions, the value of becoming a leader in sector j is:
Vt(γAjt) = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(Pt+1$γAjtLt+1 + (1− µjt+1 − η)Vt+1(γAjt))
]
. (41)
The first term inside the parenthesis on the right-hand side, also present in the baseline model,
captures the expected profits to be gained in period t + 1. In addition, the value of a successful
innovation includes the value of being a leader in period t + 1, Vt+1(γAjt), times the probability
that the entrepreneur remains the leader in period t+ 1, 1−µjt+1− η. Notice that the probability
of maintaining the leadership is decreasing in µjt+1, capturing the fact that the discovery of a
better version of product j terminates the monopoly rents for the incumbent. As in the baseline
model, future payoffs are discounted using the households’ discount factor βλt+1/λt.
To streamline the exposition, in this section we restrict attention to equilibria in which in every
period a positive amount of research is targeted toward every intermediate good.36 In this case,
free entry into research implies that expected profits from researching are zero for every product.
This zero profit condition implies that:37
Pt =
χ
Ajt
Vt(γAjt),
for every good j. Moreover, we focus on symmetric equilibria in which the probability of innovation
35Standard models of vertical innovation typically assume that η = 0. We follow Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012)
and consider the case η > 0 to be able to match a realistic value for the spending in R&D-to-GDP ratio.
36We verify that this condition holds in all the simulations presented below.
37To derive this condition, consider that an entrepreneur that invests Ijt in research has a probability χIjt/Ajt of
becoming a leader which carries value Vt(γAjt). Hence, the expected return from this investment is χIjtVt(γAjt)/Ajt.
Since the investment costs PtIjt, the zero expected profits condition in the research sector implies:
PtIjt =
χIjt
Ajt
Vt(γAjt).
Simplifying we obtain the expression in the main text.
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Table 2: Parameters
Value Source/Target
Risk aversion σ = 2 Standard value
Discount factor β = 0.99 (1 + if )/pif = 1.04
Wage inflation at full emp. pi∗ = 1.035 pif = 1.02
Intercept of wage Phillips curve p¯iw = 1.02 Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012)
Slope of wage Phillips curve ψ˜ = 1.07 p¯iw0.95ψ˜ = 0.98
Productivity of research χ = 42.08 gf = 1.015
Innovation step γ = 1.05 Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012)
Share of labor in gross output 1− α = 0.488 Profits/GDP = 5%
Prob. patent expires η = 0.19 If/GDP f = 3%
is the same in every sector, so that µjt = χIjt/Ajt = µt for every j. In this case, Vt(γAjt) = V¯tγAjt
for every j, while free entry into the research sector in period t + 1 implies V¯t+1 = Pt+1/(γχ).
Combining these conditions with expression (41) gives:
Pt
χ
= βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(
Pt+1$γLt+1 + (1− µt+1 − η) Pt+1
χ
)]
.
This expression summarizes the equilibrium in the research sector. Combining this expression with
equation (2) and using µt = (gt+1 − 1)/(χ(γ − 1)) gives:
gσt+1 = βEt
[(
ct
ct+1
)σ (
χγ$Lt+1 + 1− gt+2 − 1
γ − 1 − η
)]
,
which replaces equation (18) of the baseline model.
Parameters. We choose the length of a period to correspond to a year. The discount factor
is set to β = 0.99 to target a real interest rate in the full employment steady state of 4 percent,
and the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is set to σ = 2, a standard value
in the business-cycle literature. Moreover, we choose the value of χ, the parameter determining
the productivity of research, so that growth in the full employment steady state is equal to 1.5
percent, the average growth rate of per capita output in the postwar United States. We set the
central bank’s wage inflation target so that price inflation in the full employment steady state is
2 percent. Recalling that wage inflation is the product of price inflation and productivity growth,
this implies pi∗ = 1.02 · 1.015 = 1.035.
The step size of innovations is set to γ = 1.05, as in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012). We set the
labor share in gross output to 1− α = 0.488 to target a share of profits in GDP of 5 percent, and
the probability that a patent expires to η = 0.19 to match a ratio of spending in R&D-to-GDP
of 3 percent.38 These targets correspond to the profit share and spending in R&D-to-GDP ratio
implied by the benchmark calibration of the model in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012).
38Here we follow a large part of the endogenous growth literature that uses spending in R&D as the data counterpart
of the model’s investment in innovation. It is also possible, and in our judgement plausible, to take a broader
interpretation of investment in innovation that includes other types of investment, often difficult to measure, that
contribute to firms’ productivity growth. One example is investment in implementation of existing technologies.
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We specify the functional form for the wage Phillips curve as
(L) = p¯iwLψ˜.
We set p¯iw = 1.02, so that at full employment nominal wages are indexed at a rate at least as
large as the price inflation target. However, note that, since wage inflation is the product of price
inflation and productivity growth, the downward wage rigidity constraint is not binding at the full
employment steady state. Moreover, we calibrate the parameter ψ˜, which governs the elasticity of
wage inflation to employment, so that at an unemployment rate of 5 percent nominal wages fall
by 2 percent per year. That is we impose the restriction 0.98 = p¯iw0.95ψ˜.39
Results. Table 3 displays several statistics from this calibrated version of the model. The first
column refers to the full employment steady state. As targeted in the calibration, productivity
growth is 1.5 percent, while, by definition of the full employment steady state, unemployment is
equal to zero. The real interest rate is equal to its calibration target of 4 percent, which, coupled
with the 2 percent price inflation, implies a nominal interest rate of about 6 percent. Wage inflation
is 3.53 percent, approximately equal to the sum of price inflation and productivity growth. Finally,
about 3 percent of GDP is spent on research, as targeted in the calibration.
The second column shows the statistics for the unemployment steady state. Productivity
growth is 0.13 points lower than in the full employment steady state. This difference might seem
small, but, as we will see, it generates sizable welfare losses. Moreover, this number is in line with
the response of productivity growth to policy changes typically found in Schumpeterian growth
models (Acemoglu and Akcigit, 2012; Aghion et al., 2013). Unemployment, which in this model
corresponds to the negative of the output gap, is equal to 5.35 percent. The nominal interest
rate is equal to zero, while the real interest rate is 3.74 percent, so 26 basis point lower than in
the full employment steady state. Moreover, the unemployment steady state is characterized by
deflation and falling nominal wages. Interestingly, the ratio of spending in R&D-to-GDP in the
unemployment steady state is 2.86 percent, so only slightly lower than in the full employment
steady state. This happens because in the unemployment steady state both spending in R&D and
GDP are lower than in the full employment one.
To get a sense of the welfare losses entailed by the unemployment steady state, we computed
the consumption equivalent with respect to the full employment steady state. This is defined as the
proportional permanent increase in consumption that households living in an economy stuck in the
unemployment steady state must receive in order to be indifferent with respect to switching to the
full employment steady state.40 As shown in the last row of Table 3, the welfare losses associated
39In choosing these targets we followed the estimates of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012).
40More formally, for any generic expected consumption stream E0{Ct}∞t=0 we compute the consumption equivalent
 with respect to the full employment steady state as:
E0
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
((1 + )Ct)
1−σ − 1
1− σ
)]
=
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
(Cf,t)
1−σ − 1
1− σ
)]
,
where {Cf,t}∞t=0 is the consumption stream in the full employment steady state. When performing these computations
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Table 3: Calibrated examples
Full employment Unemployment Temporary
steady state steady state trap
Productivity growth 1.50 1.37 1.25
Unemployment rate 0.00 5.35 7.50
Nominal interest rate 6.08 0.00 0.00
Real interest rate 4.00 3.74 5.49
Price inflation 2.00 −3.60 −5.21
Wage inflation 3.53 −2.28 −4.02
R&D/GDP 2.96 2.86 2.66
Consumption equivalent 0.00 11.27 3.59
unemployment component 0.00 5.65 1.70
growth component 0.00 5.62 1.89
Note: All the values are expressed in percentage points.
with the unemployment steady state are equivalent to an 11.27 percent permanent increase in
consumption. This is a large welfare loss compared to the gains from stabilization policies usually
obtained in business-cycle models.41 To quantify the impact on welfare of the drop in productivity
growth, we decomposed the welfare losses into an unemployment and a growth component.42 The
result is that the endogenous drop in productivity accounts for about half of the loss in welfare
associated with the unemployment steady state.
The third column shows the statistics for a trap with an expected duration of ten years. This
experiment is meant to illustrate the impact on the economy of a stagnation trap of long, but
finite, expected duration. Qualitatively a temporary stagnation trap resembles the unemployment
steady state, but the difference with respect to the full employment steady state are quantitatively
larger. For instance, during the temporary trap productivity growth is 0.25 percent lower and
unemployment is 7.5 percent higher than in the full employment steady state. The only exception
is represented by the real interest rate, which during the temporary stagnation trap rises above
its value in the full employment steady state. This can be explained with the large drop in price
inflation occurring during the trap. The welfare losses linked to the temporary liquidity trap
are smaller than the ones generated by the unemployment steady state, but still quantitatively
significant since they are equal to a 3.59 percent permanent drop in consumption, about half of
which can be attributed to the drop in productivity growth.
Overall, this simple calibration exercise paints the picture of stagnation traps as persistent
periods of weak productivity growth coupled with significantly high unemployment and low output
gap. Though the fall in productivity growth associated with a stagnation trap is not dramatic, the
welfare losses associated with a prolonged stagnation trap are substantial, due to its permanent
we consider economies that start with the same initial level of productivity A0.
41To be clear, adding some of the features typical of quantitative business cycle models, most notably disutility from
working, is likely to reduce these welfare losses. However, we conjecture that the endogenous drop in productivity
will likely lead to significant welfare losses even in more realistic quantitative frameworks. We leave this interesting
question for future research.
42To compute the unemployment component, we compared welfare in the full employment steady state, to welfare
in a counterfactual economy with gt = g
f and Lt = L
u for all t. For comparison, we assumed that the fraction of
output consumed is the same in both economies. The growth component is equal to the difference between the total
welfare loss and the welfare loss attributed to the unemployment component.
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effect on long-run output.
5 Policy Implications
We now turn to the policy implications of our model. We start by considering optimal interest
rate policy, both under commitment and discretion. We then turn to growth policies aiming at
sustaining investment in productivity enhancing activities. For simplicity, we discuss the role of
these policies in the context of the baseline model described in Section 2.
5.1 Interest rate policy
In Section 3 we have shown that stagnation traps can arise if the central bank follows an interest
rate rule, in which the interest rate responds monotonically to employment or wage inflation. In
this section we examine the robustness of this result to optimal interest rate policy. The key lesson
that we derive is that the ability to commit by the central bank is crucial. As we will see, under
full commitment a central bank can implement interest rate policies that rule out stagnation traps.
Instead, if the central bank operates under discretion stagnation traps are possible, even if interest
rates are set optimally.
Commitment. Let us start by examining a central bank that operates under commitment.
To build intuition, first consider a central bank that adopts an interest rate peg, by committing
to set it = i
f in any date and state. Clearly, this policy rules out the unemployment steady state,
because the only steady state consistent with i = if is the full employment one.43 Moreover, this
policy rules out the persistent liquidity traps described in Section 3.2, because they would require
the nominal interest rate to be equal to zero. More broadly, pegging the interest rate to if rules
out stagnation traps, because for these to occur agents should anticipate a protracted period of
zero nominal interest rate. However, as it is well known, pegging the interest rate opens the door
to sunspot fluctuations around the full employment steady state.44 In fact, this is precisely one
of the reasons why adopting interest rate rules that respond to employment or inflation might be
desirable. Hence, ruling out stagnation traps by pegging the interest rate comes at the risk of
self-fulfilling fluctuations around the full employment steady state.
Another option for a central bank under commitment is to adopt a non-linear interest rate
rule.45 This approach combines a standard interest rate rule, that operates in “normal” times,
with an interest rate peg, adopted by the central bank when expectations turn pessimistic. To see
43See the proof to Proposition 1.
44Again, see the proof to Proposition 1.
45This approach follows the spirit of the one proposed by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012).
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how this approach works, define st as a binary value that follows:
st =

1 if it−1 = 0
0 if gt ≥ gf
st−1 otherwise,
for t ≥ 0 with s−1 = 0. Now consider a central bank that follows the rule:
it =
max
(
(1 + i¯)Lφt − 1, 0
)
, if st = 0
if otherwise.
Under this rule, the central bank switches to an interest rate peg the period after the nominal
interest rate hits the zero lower bound. The peg is maintained for one period, after which the
central bank returns to the interest rate rule considered in Section 3.
This policy eliminates the unemployment steady state and the persistent stagnation traps of
Section 3.2. In fact, for stagnation traps to occur agents should coordinate their expectations on a
protracted period of zero interest rates, a possibility ruled out by the central bank commitment to
maintain the interest rate equal to zero for one period at most. At the same time, this policy rule
eliminates sunspot fluctuations around the full employment steady state. Hence, a central bank
under commitment can rule out the stagnation traps discussed in Section 3, while still preserving
determinacy of the full employment steady state, by adopting a nonlinear interest rate rule.
Discretion. The picture changes dramatically if the central bank does not have the ability to
commit to its future actions. The following proposition characterizes the behavior of a benevolent
central bank that operates under discretion.
Proposition 3 Consider a central bank that operates under discretion and maximizes households’
expected utility, subject to (17), (18), (19), Lt ≤ 1 and it ≥ 0. The solution to this problem satisfies:
it (Lt − 1) = 0.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The discretionary central bank seeks to
maximize current employment.46 From the goods market clearing condition, employment is in-
46To be precise, the economy is subject to three sources of inefficiency. First, involuntary unemployment is possible.
Second, due to monopolistic competition production of intermediate goods is inefficiently low. Third, investment in
research is subject to the intertemporal spillover and business stealing effects studied by Aghion and Howitt (1992)
and Grossman and Helpman (1991), implying that in the laissez faire equilibrium the fraction of output invested in
research can be higher or lower than in the social planner allocation. However, as shown in the proof to proposition
3, interest rate policy can only seek to correct the first distortion. The economic intuition for this result is that,
since consumption and investment in research are both decreasing in the interest rate, interest rate policy cannot
affect the allocation of output between consumption and investment, and hence cannot correct for the inefficiencies
due to the intertemporal spillover and business stealing effects.
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creasing in consumption and investment in research (both normalized by productivity):
ΨLt = ct +
It
At
.
In turn, equations (17) and (18) imply that, holding expectations about the future constant, both
consumption and investment in research are decreasing in the nominal interest rate. In fact, when
the nominal interest rate falls also the real interest rate decreases, inducing households to frontload
their consumption and entrepreneurs to increase investment in research, thus stimulating output
and employment. It follows that, as long as the zero lower bound constraint does not bind, the
central bank is able to set the nominal interest rate low enough so that the economy operates at
full employment and Lt = 1. However, if a negative nominal interest rate is needed to reach full
employment then the best that the discretionary central bank can do is to set it = 0. Hence, the
economy can be in one of two regimes. Either the economy operates at full employment and the
zero lower bound constraint on the interest rate does not bind, or the economy is in a liquidity
trap with unemployment.47
We now show that under a discretionary central bank the economy can experience the same
kind of stagnation traps described in Section 3. Let us take the perspective of a discretionary
central bank operating in period t = 0. Consider a case in which expectations coordinate on the
unemployment steady state, so that E0[it] = 0, E0[Lt+1] = L
u and E0[ct+1] = c
u for every future
date t > 0 and state. From Section 3 we know that if the central bank sets i0 = 0, then L0 = L
u so
the economy will experience unemployment. Can the central bank do better by setting a positive
nominal interest rate? The answer is no, because by raising the nominal interest rate above zero
the central bank would further depress demand for consumption and investment, thus pushing
employment below Lu. Hence, if expectations coordinate on the unemployment steady state the
best response of a central bank under discretion is to set i0 = 0, implying that L0 = L
u, g1 = g
u
and c0 = c
u. A similar reasoning holds in any date t ≥ 0, meaning that the central bank’s actions
validate agents’ expectations and push the economy in the unemployment steady state. Moreover,
a similar reasoning implies that if expectations coordinate on the full employment steady state
the central bank will set i = if and validate them. Hence, under discretionary monetary policy
the two steady states analyzed in Section 2 are possible equilibria.48 Moreover, one can show that
under discretion the temporary stagnations traps described in Section 3.2 are also possible.
These results highlight the key role that the ability to commit plays in avoiding stagnation
traps through interest rate policy. Under commitment, the central bank can design interest rate
policies that make expectations of a prolonged liquidity trap inconsistent with equilibrium, thus
ruling out the possibility of long periods of stagnation. Instead, under discretion the central bank
inability to commit to its future actions leaves the door open to stagnation episodes.49
47In fact, the optimal policy under discretion is equivalent to the truncated interest rate rule considered in the
baseline model with φ→ +∞.
48This result can also be derived using the graphical approach of Figure 2. In fact, the only difference is that in
the case of a discretionary central bank the upward portion of the AD curve becomes a vertical line at L = 1.
49The result that discretionary monetary policy opens the door to multiple equilibria is reminiscent of the findings
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5.2 Growth Policy
One of the root causes of a stagnation trap is the weak growth performance of the economy,
which is in turn due to entrepreneurs’ limited incentives to innovate due to weak demand for
their products. This suggests that subsidies to investment in innovation might be a helpful tool
in the management of stagnation traps. In fact, these policies have been extensively studied in
the context of endogenous growth models as a tool to overcome inefficiencies in the innovation
process. However, here we show how policies that foster productivity growth can also play a role
in stimulating aggregate demand and employment during a liquidity trap.
The most promising form of growth policies to exit a stagnation trap are those that loosen
the link between profits and investment in innovation. For instance, suppose that the government
provides a subsidy to innovation, in the form of a lump-sum transfer sjt given to entrepreneurs
in sector j to finance investment in innovation.50 The subsidy can be state contingent and sector
specific, and it is financed with lump-sum taxes on households. Under these assumptions, the zero
profit condition for research in sector j becomes:51
Vt(γAjt) =
PtAjt
χ
(
1− sjt
Ijt
)
,
where Vt(γAjt) is defined as in (10). The presence of the term sjt/Ijt is due to the fact that
entrepreneurs have to finance only a fraction 1 − sjt/Ijt of the investment in research, while the
rest is financed by the government. This expression implies that entrepreneurs are willing to
invest in innovation even when the value of becoming a leader is zero, since if Vt(γAjt) = 0 then
Ijt = sjt. Hence, assuming that the government can ensure that entrepreneurs cannot divert the
subsidy away from innovation activities, investment in innovation will be always at least equal to
the subsidy sjt, so Ijt ≥ sjt.
Let us now consider the macroeconomic implications of the subsidy. For simplicity, we keep
on focusing on symmetric equilibria in which every sector j has the same innovation probability,
and hence we consider subsidies of the form sjt = stAjt. Assuming a positive subsidy st > 0, the
growth equation (18) is replaced by:(
1− stχ(γ − 1)
gt+1 − 1
)
= βEt
[(
ct
ct+1
)σ
g−σt+1χγ$Lt+1
]
, (42)
where to derive this expression we have followed the same steps taken in Section 3 and used
of King and Wolman (2004).
50More precisely, we assume that in sector j the government devotes an aggregate amount of resources stAjt to
sustain innovation. These resources are equally divided among all the entrepreneurs operating in innovation in that
sector.
51With the subsidy, the cost of investing Ijt in research is Pt(Ijt − sjt), which gives an expected gain of
χIjtVjt(γAjt)/Ajt. The zero expected profits condition for research in sector j then implies:
Pt (Ijt − sjt) = χIjt
Ajt
Vt(γAjt).
Rearranging this expression we obtain the expression in the main text.
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Ijt/Ajt = µt/χ = (gt+1 − 1)/(γ − 1). Notice that the expression above implies that gt+1 > 1, since
with the subsidy in place investment in innovation is always positive.
We now show that an appropriately chosen subsidy can eliminate the unemployment steady
state. Consider a subsidy of the form st = s(gt+1) with s
′(·) < 0 and s(gf ) = 0, where gf is
the productivity growth in the full employment steady state under laissez faire. According to
this policy, the government responds to a fall in productivity growth by increasing the subsidy to
investment in innovation. With the subsidy in place, in steady state the growth equation becomes:
gσ
(
1− s(g)χ(γ − 1)
g − 1
)
= βχγ$L. (43)
Notice that the term in round brackets on the left-hand side of expression (43) is smaller than one,
because s(gt+1)Ajt < Ijt. Hence, given L, steady state growth is increasing in the subsidy.
It is easy to see that, since s(gf ) = 0, the economy features a full employment steady state
identical to the one described in Section 3.1. Now turn to the unemployment steady state. In the
unemployment steady state productivity growth must be equal to gu = (β/p¯iw)(1/(σ−1)), to satisfy
households’ Euler equation. However, a sufficiently high subsidy can guarantee that investment
in innovation will always sufficiently high so that the growth rate of the economy will always be
higher than (β/p¯iw)(1/(σ−1)). It follows that by setting a sufficiently high subsidy the government
can rule out the possibility that the economy might fall in a permanent stagnation trap.
Proposition 4 Suppose that there is a subsidy to innovation s(gt+1) satisfying s
′(·) < 0, s(gf ) = 0
and:
1 + s
((
β
p¯iw
) 1
σ−1
)
χ(γ − 1) >
(
β
p¯iw
) 1
σ−1
, (44)
and that the conditions stated in proposition 1 hold. Then there exists a unique steady state. The
unique steady state is characterized by full employment.
Intuitively, the subsidy to innovation guarantees that even if firms’ profits were to fall sub-
stantially, investment in innovation would still be relatively high. In turn, a high investment in
innovation stimulates growth and aggregate demand, since a high future income is associated with
a high present demand for consumption. By implementing a sufficiently high subsidy, the govern-
ment can eliminate the possibility that aggregate demand will be low enough to make the zero
lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate bind. It is in this sense that growth policies can
be thought as a tool to manage aggregate demand in our framework. Importantly, to be effective
a subsidy to innovation has to be large enough, otherwise it might not have any positive impact
on the economy.52
52One might wonder how important it is that the subsidy is contingent on productivity growth. It turns out that
totally analogous results can be obtained with a subsidy contingent on employment. Moreover, even a sufficiently
large non-contingent subsidy can rule out the unemployment steady state. However, a non-contingent subsidy will
also increase growth, perhaps to an inefficiently high value, in the full employment steady state.
The results summarized in Proposition 4 readily extend, under a caveat, to the case of the economy with a wage
Phillips curve described in Section 4.2. The caveat is that wage inflation should not fall too much as employment
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Figure 7: Steady state with growth subsidy. Left panel: large subsidy. Right panel: small subsidy.
Graphically, the impact of the subsidy is illustrated by Figure 7. The blue solid line corresponds
to the GG curve of the economy without subsidy, while the blue dashed line represents the GG
curve of an economy with a subsidy to investment in innovation. The subsidy makes the GG curve
rotate up, because for a given level of employment and aggregate demand the subsidy increases
the growth rate of the economy. If the subsidy is sufficiently high, as it is the case in the left panel
of the figure, the unemployment steady state disappears and the only possible steady state is the
full employment one. By contrast, the right panel of Figure 7 shows the impact of a small subsidy.
A small subsidy makes the GG curve rotate up, but not enough to eliminate the unemployment
steady state. In fact, the small subsidy leads to lower employment in the unemployment steady
state compared to the laissez faire economy.
Summarizing, there is a role for well-designed subsidies to growth-enhancing investment, a
typical supply side policy, in stimulating aggregate demand so as to rule out liquidity traps driven
by expectations of weak future growth. In turn, the stimulus to aggregate demand has a positive
impact on employment. In this sense, our model helps to rationalize the notion of job creating
growth.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a Keynesian growth model in which endogenous growth interacts
with the possibility of involuntary unemployment due to weak aggregate demand. The combination
approaches zero. Using the notation of Section 4.2, the function ψ(·) must be such that:
lim
L→0
ψ(L) ≥ β
(gf )σ−1 .
Intuitively, if this condition does not hold, even when the subsidy is sufficiently high so that productivity growth
cannot fall below its value in the full employment steady state there still exists an 0 < L < 1 consistent with a
steady state in which i = 0. In this case, it is not possible to rule out the unemployment steady state with a subsidy
that is a continuous function of productivity growth or employment. However, even when the condition above fails,
it is still possible to rule out the unemployment steady state by designing subsidy schemes that are discontinuous
functions of productivity growth or employment.
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of these two factors can give rise to stagnation traps, that is persistent liquidity traps characterized
by unemployment and weak growth. All it takes for the economy to fall into a stagnation trap
is a wave of pessimism about future growth. We show that large policy interventions to support
growth can lead the economy out of a stagnation trap, thus shedding light on the role of growth
policies in stimulating aggregate demand and employment.
Our analysis represents a first step toward understanding the interactions between business
cycles, growth and stagnation, and it leaves open several exciting avenues for future research. We
conclude the paper by mentioning two of them. First, in order to focus the analysis on fluctuations
driven by shocks to expectations, in this paper we have abstracted from fundamental shocks. Can
fundamental shocks, such as productivity, monetary or news shocks, lead to prolonged periods
of stagnation? Does the impact of fundamental shocks on the economy depend on whether the
economy is undergoing a period of stagnation? These are examples of questions that our model
can help to answer. Second, in this paper we have abstracted from financial frictions. However, it
is easy to imagine a channel through which growth and aggregate demand can interact when firms’
access to financing is limited. In fact, if access to credit is tight, firms’ investment in innovation
will be constrained by their internal funds. In turn, a period of low aggregate demand and weak
profits will erode firms’ internal funds, and thus their ability to invest in productivity-enhancing
activities. Through this channel, a period of low aggregate demand will lead to low productivity
growth. Indeed, we conjecture that economies undergoing a period of financial stress might be
particularly exposed to the risk of expectation-driven stagnation traps. This might contribute to
explain why the episodes of stagnation affecting Japan, the US and the Euro area coincided, at
least in their beginning, with periods of tight access to credit.
Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (existence, uniqueness and local determinacy of full
employment steady state)
Proof. We start by proving existence. A steady state is described by the system (21)-(24). Setting
L = 1 and using the first inequality in condition (29), equation (22) implies:
gf = (βχγ$)
1
σ . (A.1)
Condition (29) implies 1 < gf < γ. Then equation (21) implies:
1 + if =
p¯iw
(
gf
)σ−1
β
. (A.2)
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Assumption (27) guarantees that if > 0 and i¯ = if , so that the interest rate rule (24) is compatible
with the existence of a full employment steady state. Moreover, combining equations (22) and (23)
evaluated at L = 1 and g = gf gives:
cf = Ψ− g
f − 1
χ(γ − 1) . (A.3)
One can check that the second inequality in condition (29) ensures that cf > 0. Hence, a full
employment steady state exists.
To prove uniqueness, consider that equation (A.1) implies that there is only one value of g
consistent with the full employment steady state, while equation (A.2) establishes that there is a
unique value of i consistent with g = gf . Hence, the full employment steady state is unique.
We now show that the full employment steady state is locally determinate. A loglinear approx-
imation of equations (17)− (20) around the full employment steady state gives:
(σ − 1)gˆt+1 = iˆt + σ(cˆt − Et[cˆt+1]) (A.4)
Lˆt =
cf
Ψ
cˆt +
(
1− c
f
Ψ
)
gf
gf − 1 gˆt+1 (A.5)
σgˆt+1 = σ(cˆt − Et[cˆt+1]) + Et
[
Lˆt+1
]
(A.6)
iˆt = φLˆt, (A.7)
where xˆ ≡ log(xt)− log(xf ) for every variable x, except for gˆt ≡ gt − gf and iˆ ≡ it − i¯, while Ψ is
GDP normalized by the productivity index. This system can be written as:
Lˆt = ξ1Et[Lˆt+1] + ξ2Et[gt+2] (A.8)
gˆt+1 = ξ3Et[Lˆt+1] + ξ4Et[gt+2], (A.9)
where
ξ1 ≡
Ψ
cf
− 1σ +
(
1 + Ψ−c
f
cf
gf
gf−1
)
Ψ
cf
+ φ
(
1 + Ψ−cf
cf
gf
gf−1
)
ξ2 ≡ −
Ψ−cf
cf
gf
gf−1
Ψ
cf
+ φ
(
1 + Ψ−cf
cf
gf
gf−1
)
ξ3 ≡ 1− φξ1
ξ4 ≡ −φξ2.
ECB Working Paper 2038, March 2017 40
The system is determinate if and only if:53
|ξ1ξ4 − ξ2ξ3| < 1 (A.10)
|ξ1 + ξ4| < 1 + ξ1ξ4 − ξ2ξ3. (A.11)
Condition (A.10) holds if:
φ >
Ψ−cf
Ψ
gf
gf−1 − 1
cf
Ψ +
Ψ−cf
Ψ
gf
gf−1
, (A.12)
while condition (A.11) holds if:
φ > 1− 1
σ
. (A.13)
Assumption (28) guarantees that (A.11) holds. Moreover, using (A.3), after some algebra, condition
(A.12) can be written as:
(1 + φ)Ψ +
φ− gf
χ(γ − 1) > 0.
By condition (29) the inequality above is true if:
φ > 1/gf = 1/(βχγ$)1/σ,
which holds by assumption (28). Hence, (A.10) holds and the full employment steady state is 
locally determinate.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 (existence, uniqueness and local indeterminacy of
unemployment steady state)
Proof. We start by showing that it is not possible to have an unemployment steady state with 
a positive nominal interest rate. Suppose that this is not the case, and that there is a steady 
state with 1 + i = (1 + ¯i)Lφ and 0 ≤ L < 1. Then combining equations (21) and (22), and using
βχγ$ = gf and 1 + i¯ =
(
gf
)σ−1
p¯iw/β gives:
gfL
φ
σ−1 =
(
max
((
gf
)σ
L, 1
)) 1
σ
. (A.14)
Assumption (28) implies that the left-hand side of this expression is smaller than the right-hand
side for any 0 ≤ L < 1. Hence, we have found a contradiction and an unemployment steady state
with i > 0 is not possible.
We now prove that an unemployment steady state with i = 0 exists and is unique. Setting
i = 0, equation (21) implies that there is a unique value of g = (β/p¯iw)1/(σ−1) = gu consistent with
the unemployment steady state. Moreover, since if > 0 equation (21) also implies that gu < gf ,
while the first inequality in condition (30) implies gu > 1. Evaluating equation (22) at g = gu we
53See Bullard and Mitra (2002).
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have:
Lu =
(gu)σ
βχγ$
,
ensuring that there is a unique value of L = Lu > 0 consistent with g = gu. Moreover, using 
gu < gf and equation (22) gives Lu < 1. Combining equations (22) and (23) evaluated at L = Lu 
and g = gu, one can check that the second inequality in condition (30) ensures that cu > 0. 
Hence, the unemployment steady state exists and is unique. Finally, using if > 0 and gu < gf one 
can see that 1/piu = gu/p¯iw < (1 + if )gf /p¯iw = (1 + if )/pif , so that the real interest rate in the 
unemployment steady state is lower than the one in the full employment steady state.
To prove local indeterminacy one can follow the steps of the proof to proposition one. Since 
in the neighborhood of the unemployment steady state iˆt = 0, it is easy to show that condition 
(A.11) cannot be satisfied.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3 (optimal discretionary monetary policy)
Proof. Under discretion, every period the central bank maximizes the representative household 
expected utility subject to (17), (18), (19), Lt ≤ 1 and it ≥ 0, taking future variables as given. 
The central bank’s problem can be written as:
max
Lt,ct,gt+1,it
Et
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ
((
C1−στ − 1
1− σ
)]
= Et
[
βtA1−σt
(
c1−σt
1− σ + gt+1ν
1
t
)]
− 1
(1− β)(1− σ) ,
subject to:
Lt =
1
Ψ
(
ct +
gt+1 − 1
χ(γ − 1)
)
ct =
(
gσ−1t+1
1 + it
) 1
σ
ν2t
gt+1 = max
(
1,
ν3t
1 + it
)
Lt ≤ 1
it ≥ 0,
where the third constraint is obtained by combining (17) and (18), and:
ν1t = Et
[ ∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ
(
cτΠ
τ
τˆ=t+2gτˆ
)1−σ
1− σ
]
ν2t =
(
p¯iw
βEt
[
c−σt+1
]) 1σ
ν3t = p¯i
wχγ$
Et[Lt+1c
−σ
t+1]
Et[c
−σ
t+1]
.
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ν1t , ν
2
t and ν
3
t are taken as given by the central bank, because they are function of parameters and
expectations about future variables only.
Notice that the objective function is strictly increasing in ct and gt+1. Also notice that from
the second and third constraints we can write ct = c(it) with c
′(it) < 0 and gt+1 = g(it) with
g′(it) ≤ 0. We can then rewrite the problem of a central bank under discretion as
min it,
subject to:
Lt =
1
Ψ
(
c(it) +
g(it)− 1
χ(γ − 1)
)
Lt ≤ 1
it ≥ 0.
The solution to this problem can be expressed by the complementary slackness condition:
it (Lt − 1) = 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4 (uniqueness of steady state with subsidy to inno-
vation)
The proof that a full employment steady state exists and is unique follows the steps of the proof
to Proposition 1.
We now prove that there is no steady state with unemployment. Following the proof to propo-
sition 2, one can check that if another steady state exists, it must be characterized by i = 0.
Equation (17) implies that in this steady state growth must be equal to (β/p¯iw)(1/(σ−1)). Suppose
that a steady state with g = (β/p¯iw)(1/(σ−1)) exists. Then equation (43) implies that there must
be an 0 ≤ L˜ ≤ 1 such that:
L˜ =
(
β
p¯iw
) σ
σ−1
1− s
((
β
p¯iw
) 1
σ−1
)
χ(γ − 1)(
β
p¯iw
) 1
σ−1 − 1
 (βχγ$)−1.
But condition (44) implies L˜ < 0, a contradiction. Hence, an unemployment steady state does not
exist. 
B Model with money
In this appendix we explicitly introduce money in the model. The presence of money rationalizes
the zero lower bound constraint on the nominal interest rate, but does not alter the equilibrium
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conditions of the model.
Following Krugman (1998) and Eggertsson (2008) we assume that households need to hold at
least a fraction ν > 0 of production in money balances M :
Mt ≥ νPtYt. (B.1)
The household’s budget constraint is now:
PtCt +
bt+1
1 + it
+Mt = WtLt + bt +Mt−1 + dt − Tt, (B.2)
where Mt denotes money holdings at time t to be carried over at time t+ 1, and T are lump-sum
taxes paid to the government.
The optimality condition with respect to Mt is:
λt = βEt [λt+1] + µt, (B.3)
where µt > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (B.1). Combining optimality conditions (3)
and (B.3) it is easy to see that the presence of money implies it ≥ 0. Intuitively, households will
always prefer to hold money, rather than an asset which pays a non-contingent negative nominal
return. It is also easy to see that constraint (B.1) binds if it > 0, but it is slack if it = 0. Hence,
households’ money demand is captured by the complementary slackness condition:
it
(
Mt − νPt
(
α
ξ
) α
1−α
AtLt
)
= 0, (B.4)
with it ≥ 0 and Mt ≥ νPt
(
α
ξ
) α
1−α
AtLt, where we have substituted Yt using equation (9).
To close the model, we assume that the government runs a balanced budget:
Tt = Mt −Mt−1,
so that seignorage revenue is rebated to households via lump sum taxes.
We can now define an equilibrium as a set of processes {Lt, ct, gt+1, it,Mt, Pt}+∞t=0 satisfying
equations (17)− (20), (B.4) and Pt = p¯iwPt−1/gt, given initial values P−1, A0.54
Notice that to solve for the path of Lt, ct, gt+1 and it only equations (17) − (20) are needed.
Given values for Lt, At and Pt, the only use of the money demand equation (B.4) is to define the
money supply Mt consistent with the central bank’s interest rate rule. Specifically, when it > 0
the equilibrium money supply is Mt = νPt (α/ξ)
α
1−α AtLt, while when it = 0 any money supply
Mt ≥ νPt (α/ξ)
α
1−α AtLt is consistent with equilibrium.
These results do not rest on the specific source of money demand assumed. For instance,
54To derive the law of motion for Pt we have used the equilibrium condition pit = pi
w
t /gt and the law of motion for
Wt.
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similar results can be derived in a setting in which households derive utility from holding real
money balances, as long as a cashless limit is considered (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003).
C The cases of σ = 1 and σ < 1
In the main text we have focused attention on the empirically relevant case of low elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, by assuming that σ > 1. In this appendix we consider the alternative
cases σ = 1 and σ < 1. The key result is that under these cases the steady state is unique.
We start by analyzing the case of σ = 1. In steady state, equation (21) can be written as:
1 =
β(1 + i)
p¯iw
.
Intuitively, under this case changes in the growth rate of the economy have no impact on the
equilibrium nominal interest rate. Hence, if there exists a full employment equilibrium featuring a
positive nominal interest rate, it is easy to check that no unemployment equilibrium can exist.
We now turn to the case σ < 1. Under this case, equation (21) implies a negative relationship
between growth and the nominal interest rate. Supposing that a full employment equilibrium
featuring a positive nominal interest rate exists, if a liquidity trap equilibrium exists, it must
feature a higher growth rate than the full employment one, i.e. gu > gf . Since Lf = 1, it must be
the case that Lu ≤ Lf . But equation (22) implies a nonnegative steady state relationship between
g and L. Then we cannot have a steady state in which gu > gf and Lu ≤ Lf , so that, if the
economy features a full employment steady state, an unemployment steady state cannot exist.
D Numerical solution method to compute perfect foresight tran-
sitions
The objective is to compute a sequence {gt+1, Lt, ct, it}Tt=0 given an initial condition L0 for T large
such that:
cσt =
cσt+1g
σ−1
t+1 p¯i
w
β(1 + it)
(D.1)
(gt+1 − 1)
(
1− β
[(
ct
ct+1
)σ
g−σt+1χγ$Lt+1
])
= 0 (D.2)
ct = ΨLt − gt+1 − 1
χ(γ − 1) (D.3)
1 + it = max
(
(1 + i¯)Lφt , 1
)
, (D.4)
and Lt ≤ 1 hold for all t ∈ {0, ..., T}. We restrict attention to sequences that converge to the
unemployment steady state.
The algorithm follows these steps:
1. Guess a sequence {Lt}T+1t=1 . Set LT+1 = Lu.
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2. Use (D.1), (D.2), (D.3) and (D.4) evaluated at t = 0, the initial condition L0 and the guess
for L1 to solve for g1 and c0.
3. For any t ∈ {1, ..., T}, use equations (D.1) and (D.4) evaluated at t− 1 and values for Lt−1,
gt and ct−1 to solve for ct. Use (D.1), (D.2), (D.3) and (D.4) evaluated at t, and Lt+1 to
solve for gt+1.
4. Use equations (D.1) and (D.4) evaluated at T and values for LT , gT+1 and cT to solve for
cT+1.
5. Evaluate convergence by checking that the market clearing condition (D.3) holds for any
t ∈ {1, ..., T} and that the sequence has converged to the unemployment steady state. If
sup ||ΨLt − ct − (gt+1 − 1)(χ(γ − 1))|| for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} and ||cT+1 − cu|| are sufficiently
small we have found a solution. Otherwise compute:
Lˆt = Lt − 
(
ΨLt − ct − gt+1 − 1
χ(γ − 1)
)
,
where  is a small positive number. Update the guess by setting Lt = min
(
Lˆt, 1
)
for any
t ∈ {1, ..., T} and go to step 2.
E Model with unemployment risk
In this appendix, we lay down the model with idiosyncratic unemployment risk described in Sec-
tion 4.1. In this model, each household faces in every period a constant probability p of being
unemployed. The employment status is revealed to the household at the start of the period. An
unemployed household receives an unemployment benefit, such that its income is equal to a frac-
tion b < 1 of the income received by employed households. Unemployment benefits are financed
with taxes on employed households.
The budget constraint of a household now becomes:
PtCt +
bt+1
1 + it
= νtWtLt + bt + dt + Tt.
The only change with respect to the benchmark model is the presence of the variables ν and T ,
which summarize the impact of the employment status on a household’s budget. ν is an indicator
variable that takes value 1 if the household is employed, and 0 if the household is unemployed. T
represents a lump-sum transfer for unemployed households, and a tax for employed households. T
is set such that the income of an unemployed household is equal to a fraction b of the income of
an employed household.55
55More precisely, an unemployed household receives a transfer:
T =
bWtLt + (b− 1)dt
1 + bp
1−p
,
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Moreover, here we assume that households cannot borrow:
bt+1 ≥ 0,
and that trade in firms’ shares is not possible, so that every household receives the same dividends
d.
The Euler equation is now:
c−σt =
β(1 + it)Et
[
c−σt+1
]
gσ−1t+1 p¯iw
+ µt,
where µt is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint and, as in the main text, ct ≡
Ct/At.
We start by showing that the borrowing constraint binds only for unemployed households. Since
neither households nor firms can borrow, in equilibrium every period every household consumes
her entire income. Denoting, by cet and c
ne
t the consumption of respectively an employed and
an unemployed household, we have cnet = bc
e
t < c
e
t . Moreover, due to the assumption of i.i.d.
idiosyncratic shocks, Et
[
c−σt+1
]
is independent of the employment status. Hence, from the Euler
equation it follows that µt > 0 only for the unemployed, and so the borrowing constraint does not
bind for employed households.
The Euler equation of the employed households is:
(cet )
σ =
p¯iwgσ−1t+1
β(1 + it)ρEt
[(
cet+1
)−σ] ,
where ρ ≡ 1−p+p/bσ > 1, and we have used the fact that the probability of becoming unemployed
is independent of aggregate shocks. Moreover, using ct = pc
ne
t + (1 − p)cet = cet (bp + 1 − p), we
obtain:
cσt =
p¯igσ−1t+1
β(1 + it)ρEt
[
c−σt+1
] .
This equation, which is the equivalent of equation (17) in the baseline model, determines the
demand for consumption in the model with idiosyncratic unemployment risk.
while an employed household pays a tax
T = − p
1− p
bWtLt + (b− 1)dt
1 + bp
1−p
.
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